We introduce a new solution concept, called correlated-belief equilibrium. The difference to Nash equilibrium is that, while each player has correct marginal conjectures about each opponent, it is not necessarily the case that these marginal conjectures are independent. Then, we provide an epistemic foundation and we relate correlated-belief equilibrium with standard solution concepts, such as rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and conjectural equilibrium.
Introduction
Beliefs have recently become a very useful tool for game-theoretic analysis. One of the main advantages from incorporating beliefs into our game-theoretic models is that they allow us to explicitly distinguish between what players think that their opponents will do and what their opponents actually do. Thus, they help us better understand the implicit assumptions that are often present in the definition of a solution concept. Take for instance Nash equilibrium (NE), which is the most well-known and widelyused game-theoretic solution concept. According to the standard definition, a strategy profile is a NE if each player's strategy is optimal given the opponents' strategies (Nash 1951) . However, in a simultaneous-move game it is difficult to imagine that players respond to the opponents' actual strategies. Instead, it seems more natural to assume B Elias Tsakas e.tsakas@maastrichtuniversity.nl 1 Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands that they form beliefs about their opponents' strategies and then they respond to these beliefs. In this sense, one could say that a NE implicitly postulates that players respond optimally to their beliefs about their opponents' strategies and these beliefs turn out to be correct. This alternative statement/interpretation of NE in terms of beliefs has inspired the literature on the epistemic foundations for NE, e.g., in their leading paper Brandenburger (1995, p. 1161) begin with the preliminary observation that "if each player is rational and knows the strategy choices of the others, the players' choices constitute a Nash equilibrium in the game being played".
Formally, a belief is modeled with a probability measure over the set of the opponents' strategy profiles. Note that this does not necessarily need to be a product measure, implying that the player may in principle hold correlated beliefs, even if in reality her opponents choose their strategies independently from each other. A player may hold correlated beliefs, for instance, either because she thinks that her opponents use a correlating device (Aumann 1974 (Aumann , 1987 or because she thinks that their opponents' beliefs are themselves correlated (Brandenburger and Friedenberg 2008) . Thus, as long as the players actually choose their strategies independently from each other, the notion of correct beliefs that is implicitly present in the definition of NE, requires each player (i) to have correct marginal beliefs about each individual opponent, and (ii) to have independent marginal beliefs.
In this paper, we drop the requirement that players have independent marginal beliefs, while maintaining the assumption that their marginal beliefs about each individual opponent are correct. This induces a new solution concept called correlatedbelief equilibrium (CBE). Obviously, the predictions made by CBE are a coarsening of the corresponding NE predictions. Moreover, it is straightforward that the two solution concepts yield exactly the same strategy profiles in two-player games.
Our first aim is to provide an epistemic justification for this solution concept. To do so, we begin by looking into the history of the epistemic foundations for NE. In their seminal article, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) proved that mutual belief in rationality and common belief in conjectures suffice for a NE if there is a common prior. This last assumption, while being often present in many game-theoretic results, has been extensively criticized mostly on the basis of its conceptual foundations being questionable (e.g., see Gul 1998) . In fact, Feinberg (2000) characterized the common prior assumption by means of a no-bet condition. In particular, he showed that a common prior exists if and only if the players cannot agree on any (zero-sum) bet. The fact that a common prior is characterized in terms of all possible bets makes it a rather strong assumption. This is because some bets are defined in terms of conditions that involve higher order beliefs, and in this respect they may not even be verifiable based on hard evidence, e.g., consider the bet according to which Bob has to pay Ann one monetary unit if she thinks that Carol will choose the strategy L with probability more than 1/2, and she has to pay him one monetary unit otherwise. Obviously, in this case there is no way to verify whether Ann reports her true beliefs or not, when she says that she does indeed find it more likely that Carol will choose L.
Having recognized how restrictive the common prior assumption is, Barelli (2009) replaced it with a weaker condition, called action-consistency ( A-consistency) , which is characterized by the players not agreeing to take any bet described in terms of the language generated by the pure strategy profiles. In other words, A-consistency postulates that the players cannot agree on any (zero-sum) bet whose outcome depends solely on which pure strategy profile is played in the game. Note that in this case in order to decide who wins the side bet it is necessary to observe the realized pure strategy profile.
Let us now assume instead that the players cannot agree on any bet described in terms of the language generated by any player's individual pure strategies. That is, we postulate that the players cannot agree on any (zero-sum) bet whose outcome depends solely on an arbitrary single player's pure strategy. Let us call this no-bet condition I -consistency. Obviously, I -consistency is weaker than Barelli's A-consistency, as it requires players not being able to agree on fewer bets than A-consistency requires. Then, we show that by replacing A-consistency with I -consistency in Barelli's set of epistemic conditions (for NE) we provide sufficient epistemic conditions for CBE (see Theorem 1). We should point out that our epistemic conditions do not in general suffice for NE (see Example 2).
The previously-mentioned result justifies CBE by simply allowing for more priors than the ones that would lead to a NE. In this sense, similarly to the literature on the epistemic conditions for NE, it describes a set of belief hierarchies which would be consistent with CBE. Still, it does not explain how players would end up forming such beliefs, and consequently why they would end up behaving in accordance to the profiles that CBE predicts. We do this, by studying the relationship of CBE with other solution concepts, and in particular with conjectural equilibrium, a solution concept with well-established learning foundations which also permits false beliefs (e.g., see Hahn 1977 Hahn , 1978 Battigalli 1987; Battigalli and Guaitoli 1997) .
Conjectural equilibrium does not necessarily require each player's belief to be correct in the probability it attaches to each pure strategy profile of the opponents. Instead, it assumes that each player receives a signal-upon each pure strategy profile being realized-and it requires each player's belief not to contradict the empirical distribution of the received signals. If the signals are precise enough to reveal the strategy profile being played, then conjectural equilibrium coincides with NE. Now, notice that observing such precise signals would lead each player to learn not only each opponent's mixed strategy distribution, but also the fact that the opponents choose independently from each other. On the other hand, in a CBE players are implicitly assumed to have learned each opponent's mixed strategy, without having necessarily learned that the opponents choose independently from each other. Indeed, we show that CBE can be rewritten as a new variant of conjectural equilibrium with multiple signals, each of them revealing one opponent's strategy (see Theorem 2). We also show that CBE is not a special case of the standard conjectural equilibrium with a single signal function for each player (see Example 3).
Besides the conceptual foundations of CBE, we relate the predictions that our concept makes with other standard solution concepts. Starting with rationalizability, we prove that every CBE is correlated rationalizable, i.e., it survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. This is rather straightforward to see, as the correct-marginal-beliefs assumption that we maintain, together with rationality, directly imply that the support of a CBE is a (correlated) best response set. On the other hand, this is not the case for independent rationalizability. In fact, it turns out that CBE and independent rationalizability neither refine nor coarsen each other. This is also natural to expect, as the two generalize NE in different directions. Now, turning to correlated equilibrium, we show that every CBE is essentially equivalent to a subjective correlated equilibrium. While we provide a constructive proof of this result which clearly illustrates the relationship between the two, notice that this also follows from the standard result of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) , who showed that every correlated rationalizable strategy profile is essentially equivalent to a refinement of subjective correlated equilibrium, viz., a posteriori equilibrium. Finally, we show that the same equivalence does not hold for objective correlated equilibrium.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces some preliminary definitions, in Sect. 3 we define CBE and we prove some basic properties, Sect. 4 contains our epistemic foundation of the concept, while in Sect. 5 we provide the formal link to other solution concepts. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
Preliminaries

Product measures
Normal form games
Consider a finite normal form game I, (A i ) i∈I , (u i ) i∈I , where I = {1, . . . , n} denotes the finite set of players and A i denotes the finite set of pure strategies of an arbitrary player i ∈ I with typical element a i . 
(1)
Then, we say that σ i is a best response to (σ 1 , . . . , σ i−1 , σ i+1 , . . . , σ n ) and we write
Finally, recall that a strategy profile (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) whenever
Beliefs
A belief-often called conjecture-of player i ∈ I is a probability measure μ i ∈ (A −i ). Notice that μ i is not necessarily a product measure over A −i , thus implying that player i may believe that her opponents' strategies are correlated, even if in reality they are chosen independently. The following definition formalizes what it means for a player to have independent (marginal) beliefs.
Definition 1 Player i has independent (marginal) beliefs whenever μ i ∈ (A −i ). On the other hand, we say that player i has correlated beliefs whenever
While we allow players to have correlated beliefs, we do not impose any assumption regarding the source of correlation. That is, player i may hold correlated beliefs either because she believes that her opponents j and k actually use a physical correlating device similarly to Aumann (1974 Aumann ( , 1987 , or because she believes that j and k have themselves correlated belief hierarchies like for instance in Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008) . The former type of correlation is called extrinsic correlation, whereas the latter is called intrinsic correlation.
We define i's (subjective) expected utility from the mixed strategy σ i ∈ i given the conjecture μ i ∈ (A −i ) by
As usual, we say that σ i ∈ i is a rational/optimal strategy given the belief μ i ∈ (A −i ), and we write σ i ∈ B R i (μ i ), whenever it is the case that
Then, it is straightforward to verify that a mixed strategy profile (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) is a NE if and only if for every i ∈ I there is a conjecture
Whenever it is the case that μ i = σ −i we say that player i has correct beliefs.
Definition and basic properties
The correct beliefs assumption, which is implicitly present in the definition of NE, essentially postulates that each player (i) correctly guesses each opponent's mixed strategy, and (ii) has independent beliefs. Formally, player i has correct beliefs whenever μ i satisfies the following two conditions:
In this paper, we partially relax the correct beliefs assumption, by dropping IB while maintaining CMB. That is, while we still assume that each player has a correct marginal belief about each individual opponent, we do not require her to have independent marginal beliefs. As a result we obtain a new solution concept, which we call correlated-belief equilibrium.
It is obvious that the set of CBE is a coarsening of the set of NE. The following result formally proves that this is the case.
Proposition 1 Every NE is a CBE.
Though rather straightforward, it is worthwhile to mention that the existence of a CBE follows directly from the previous result.
Corollary 1 Every finite normal form game has a CBE.
In general the converse of Proposition 1 is not true, as illustrated by the following example. In particular, it turns out that CBE may predict strictly more strategy profiles than NE does. 
Note that this is not a NE, as Ann has an incentive to deviate to (1 R), which would yield expected payoff equal to 1, instead of the 1/2 that σ a yields. In other words, σ a is not a rational strategy, if Ann has independent beliefs. However, σ a can be sustained as a rational strategy if her conjecture is D) . In this case, Ann has correct marginal beliefs, but not independent beliefs, viz., while μ a is such that marg Still, some partial converse results can be established. First, we show that in twoplayer games the set of NE coincides with the set of CBE. This is not surprising, as the only difference between a CBE and a NE is that the latter requires the players to have independent beliefs. However, if there are only two players in the game, each of them has a unique opponent and therefore the marginal beliefs are trivially independent.
Proposition 2 In two-player games every CBE is a NE.
Second, we show that the set of pure strategy NE coincides with the set of pure strategy CBE. Again, the reason is rather obvious, viz., if every player chooses a pure strategy, the only conjecture with correct marginal beliefs is equal to the product measure of the opponents' (pure) strategies.
Proposition 3 Every pure-strategy CBE is a NE.
Epistemic foundations
In this section, we provide sufficient epistemic conditions for CBE, thus obtaining a foundation for CBE. In particular, our conditions weaken the standard epistemic foundations for NE by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) and Barelli (2009) .
Epistemic models
A belief hierarchy describes a player's belief about the opponents'ss strategies (first order beliefs), belief about the opponents' strategies and first order beliefs (second order beliefs), and so on. Formally, for an arbitrary player i consider the following sequence of (Polish) spaces 1 : For each player i ∈ I , let 0 i := A −i , and for each
Then, a belief hierarchy of player i is a sequence of Borel probability measures (
satisfying coherency and common certainty in coherency, with 
is a continuous function, with T −i := × j =i T j . Throughout the paper we consider countable type space models. This is without loss of generality, as our analysis can be directly generalized to arbitrary type space models. Each type t i ∈ T i is associated with a belief hierarchy
, where the k-th order beliefs assign probability
to an arbitrary Borel subset E ⊆ 0
For a given type space model, 
contains the states where player i is rational. Now, for every s ∈ S define the Borel probability measureβ i (s) ∈ (S), such that for an arbitrary Borel event E ⊆ S,
denotes the probability that player i attaches to E at the state s. Note that player i is implicitly assumed to know both her own strategy and her own type at every state, Footnote 2 continued we recursively define
H −1 j = 1 for all k ≥ 0 as the set of belief hierarchies satisfying -fold certainty in coherency, and we say that a belief hierarchy satisfies common certainty in coherency if it is an element of H i := ≥1 H i (Harsanyi 1967 (Harsanyi -1968 Mertens and Zamir 1985; Brandenburger and Dekel 1993). which is why she attaches probability 0 to every event that contradicts her actual strategy-type profile.
We say that player i believes in E at all states that belong to the event
Moreover, we say that E is mutually believed if everybody believes in it, and we write
Finally, we say that E is commonly believed if everybody believes in it, everybody believes that everybody believes in it, and so on. Formally, for each m ≥ 1 we recursively define m-th order mutual belief in E by B m (E) :
. Then, the states that belong to the event
are those at which E is commonly believed.
Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
In their seminal paper, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) provided a set of sufficient epistemic conditions for NE, by showing that in a complete information game, common belief of conjectures and mutual belief in rationality suffice for a NE, whenever there is a common prior 3 . Recall that a Borel probability measure q ∈ (S) is a common prior if for every player i ∈ I and for every s ∈ S with q 
In a more recent paper, Barelli (2009) generalized Aumann and Brandenburger's epistemic conditions, by substituting the common prior assumption and common belief in conjectures with weaker conditions respectively. Formally, Barelli (2009) relaxed the common prior assumption, by introducing the weaker notion of actionconsistency. Accordingly, consider the set of A-measurable random variables,
Henceforth, a function f ∈ F A is called A-verifiable, as the value of f at some state reveals the strategy profile being played at this state. Then, a probability measure q ∈ (S) is called action-consistent (A-consistent) whenever it is the case that
for every i ∈ I and every f ∈ F A . In fact, whenever A is finite, Eq. (9) implies
for every i ∈ I and every a ∈ A. Then, Barelli (2009) characterized of A-consistency in terms of A-verifiable bets. We define a bet as a collection { f i } i∈I of random variables such that i∈I f i (s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. A bet is A-verifiable whenever f i ∈ F A for all i ∈ I . Then, it can be shown that there is an A-consistent probability measure in (S) if and only if there is no mutually beneficial A-verifiable bet, i.e., formally, q ∈ (S) is A-consistent if and only if there exists no A-verifiable bet { f i } i∈I such that s ∈Sβ i (s)(s )· f i (s ) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ Supp(q) and for all i ∈ I , with at least one inequality being strict. Furthermore, for some A-consistent measure q ∈ (S), the conjectures are said to be constant in the support of q whenever there exists a profile of conjectures (μ 1 , . . . , μ n ) such that μ 1 (s), . . . ,μ n (s) = (μ 1 , . . . , μ n ) for all s ∈ Supp(q). Then, Barelli (2009) generalized Aumann and Brandenburger's epistemic conditions for NE, by simultaneously replacing their common prior assumption with A-consistency, and common belief of the conjectures with constant conjectures in the support of the A-consistent distribution. Formally, Barelli's result is stated as follows. Let (μ 1 , . . . , μ n ) be a tuple of conjectures and suppose that there is an A-consistent q ∈ (S) such that μ 1 (s), . . . ,μ n (s) = (μ 1 , . . . , μ n ) for all s ∈ Supp(q). Moreover, assume that there is some state s ∈ Supp(q) such that
Theorem B (Barelli 2009)
To see that Barelli's conditions are weaker than Aumann and Brandenburger's, first observe that a common prior is always A-consistent. This is not surprising given the existing characterizations of the two concepts. In particular, a common prior essentially says that the players will not agree to take any bet that is defined in terms of events in the Borel σ -algebra S of events in S (Feinberg 2000) , whereas A-consistency essentially says that the players will not agree to take any bet that is defined in terms of events in the sub-σ -algebra S A which is generated by the collection {[a]|a ∈ A} (Barelli 2009 ).
Obviously, the former is more restrictive than the latter-by the fact that S A ⊆ Swhich is in accordance to our observation that a common prior is A-consistent.
Finally, in the existence of a common prior, constant conjectures in the support of the (action-consistent) common prior directly implies common belief of the conjectures.
Epistemic conditions for correlated-belief equilibrium
According to Barelli's characterization, an A-consistent probability measure exists if and only if there is no mutually beneficial bet that is described in terms of all players' pure strategies. Now, let us relax this condition by instead assuming that players are not able to agree on a bet which is described in terms of a single player's pure strategies. In order to do this, we first define, for an arbitrary i ∈ I , the set of A i -measurable random variables,
Henceforth, a function f ∈ F A i is called A i -verifiable, as the value of f at some state reveals the pure strategy chosen by player i at this state.
Definition 3 A probability measure q ∈ (S) is called A i -consistent whenever it is the case that
for every j ∈ I and every f ∈ F A i . Moreover, we say that q ∈ (S) is I-consistent, whenever it is A i -consistent for every i ∈ I .
Similarly to Barelli (2009) , it can be shown that whenever A i is finite, Eq. (11) implies
for every j ∈ I and every a i ∈ A i . Hence, if q is I -consistent, (12) holds for every i ∈ I . Then, following the same steps as in Barelli (2009, Prop. 5 
.3), it can be shown that there is an A i -consistent probability measure in (S) if and only if there is no mutually beneficial A i -verifiable bet, viz., q ∈ (S) is A i -consistent if and only if there exists no
for all s ∈ Supp(q) and for all j ∈ I , with at least one inequality being strict. Thus, q ∈ (S) is I -consistent if and only if there is no A i -verifiable bet satisfying (13) for any i ∈ I . The intuition behind the previous characterization of A i -consistency is the players will not agree to take any bet that is defined in terms of events in the sub-σ -algebra S A i which is generated by the collection {[a i ]|a i ∈ A i }. That is, I -consistency essentially says that the players will not agree on any bet that is described in terms of events in S A 1 , and they will not agree on any bet that is described in terms of events in S A 2 , and . . . , and and they will not agree on any bet that is described in terms of events in S A n . Notice that for every i ∈ I it is the case that S A i ⊆ S A , thus implying that every A-consistent prior is also I -consistent.
Then, the following result proves that if we replace A-consistency with Iconsistency in Barelli's Theorem, the marginal conjectures will form a CBE rather than a NE. Thus, we provide sufficient epistemic conditions for CBE. Let (μ 1 , . . . , μ n ) be a tuple of conjectures and suppose that there is an I -consistent q ∈ (S) such that μ 1 (s), . . . ,μ n (s) = (μ 1 , . . . , μ n ) for all s ∈ Supp(q). Moreover, assume that there is some state s ∈ Supp(q) such that s ∈ B(R 1 ∩ · · · ∩ R n ). Then, there exists a mixed strategy profile (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ such that
Theorem 1
Note that I -consistency does not force players to agree on the probabilities they attach an arbitrary event in S A , e.g., Ann and Bob do not need to have the same conjecture about Carol and David jointly. However, it is still the case that under Iconsistency all players other than i necessarily agree on the probabilities they attach to each event in S A i , e.g., Ann and Bob necessarily have the same marginal conjecture about Carol, as well as the same marginal conjecture about David. This, explains why in a CBE players can have different conjectures, but not different marginal conjectures. On the other hand, under A-consistency, players agree not only on their marginal beliefs, but also on their joint beliefs -as everybody's conjectures are product measures -and therefore A-consistency suffices for NE.
Still, it is natural to ask whether our (weaker) conditions of Theorem 1 also suffice for NE. 5 It turns out that this is not the case, as shown in the following example. . Now, consider a type space model (T i ) i∈I , (λ i ) i∈I with a unique type for each player. i.e., T i = {t i } for each i ∈ {a, b, c}, where
(B, t b ) .
Moreover, consider the probability measure q ∈ (S) defined by
(B, t b ), (D, t c )
and notice that it is I -consistent, while at the same time the conjectures are constant in the support of q. Thus, the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied, and as expected Remark 1 Obviously, in two player games, it suffices to simply require mutual belief in conjectures similarly to Aumann and Brandenburger (1995, Thm. A) The reason is that-as we have already mentioned-in two player games the set of CBE coincides with the set of NE.
Remark 2 In a recent paper, Bach and Tsakas (2014) further generalized Barelli's result-and a fortiori the one of Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) -by replacing his epistemic conditions with respective pairwise epistemic conditions imposed only for some pairs of players. A similar generalizations can be done for CBE, by assuming pairwise mutual belief in rationality, pairwise I -consistency and pairwise constant conjectures in the supports of the I -consistent distributions. However, due to space limitations, we omit the presentation of this result.
Remark 3 Notice that throughout this section, for notation simplicity, we have focused entirely on complete information games, even though our result can be directly extended to type spaces with uncertainty about the payoff functions, as long as these are mutually believed.
Relationship to other solution concepts
Conjectural equilibrium
CBE is not the first equilibrium concept in the literature that allows for correlated beliefs. In fact, this idea was already present in conjectural equilibrium, which was introduced by Hahn (1977 Hahn ( , 1978 , later formalized by Battigalli (1987) and further developed by Battigalli and Guaitoli (1997) and Gilli (1999) . 6 The underlying idea behind all these papers is that a player's beliefs do not need to coincide with the product measure induced by the opponents' actual mixed strategy profile. Instead, beliefs should only be confirmed for some events in A −i . Formally, for an arbitrary player i ∈ I , let ψ i : A → M i be a signal function with M i being an arbitrary set of signals. Whenever the pure strategy profile a ∈ A is played, player i does not necessarily observe it-even after the strategies have been realized-and instead receives the signal ψ i (a), thus considering possible the pure strategy profiles in ψ
A natural example of a signal function is the own utility function, viz., suppose that player i observes only his own utility, but not the pure strategy profile that induced it. Then, for an arbitrary a i ∈ A i , let
15) be the set of the opponents' pure strategy profiles which together with a i would induce the signal m i . A conjectural equilibrium captures the idea each player responds rationally to a (possibly wrong) conjecture about the strategies chosen by their opponents. Still, this conjecture-though possibly wrong-is not contradicted by the signal that the player observes after the actions have been realized. Formally, for a profile of signal functions ψ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ), we say that a strategy profile (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) is a ψ-conjectural equilibrium, if for every i ∈ I there is a belief
The underlying idea is that an arbitrary player i ∈ I observes a large sample of realized combinations of the own action and the corresponding signal, a i , ψ i (a) . Then, the probability that the conjecture μ i assigns to each signal (conditional on each own pure strategy) is equal to the empirical frequency of this signal (conditional on each own pure strategy). Therefore, i's conjecture is confirmed by the observed sample.
If the signal function of each player induces the discrete partition over A, i.e., if ψ i (a) = ψ i (a ) for any a, a ∈ A, a strategy profile is a conjectural equilibrium if and only if it is a NE. Moreover, it is straightforward that for any given signal functions (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) the set of conjectural equilibria lies between NE and correlated rationalizability, similarly to what happens with CBE. 7 The natural question arising then is whether there exists some ψ such that the set of CBE coincides with the set of ψ-conjectural equilibria. The following example shows that this is not necessarily the case, thus implying that CBE is not a special case of conjectural equilibrium. 
B)
and σ c = (
, and observe that it is a CBE. In fact, it is the only CBE with Ann choosing L. Then, let us show that there is no ψ = (ψ a , ψ b , ψ c ) such that the set of ψ-conjectural equilibria coincide with the set of CBE. In particular, we show that for every ψ, either there is a ψ-conjectural equilibrium that is not a CBE, or it is the case that (σ a , σ b , σ c ) is not a ψ-conjectural equilibrium. First, observe that in order for (σ a , σ b , σ c ) to be a ψ-conjectural equilibrium it must be the case that Supp( (L , A, C) . This is without loss of generality due to symmetry. Then, irrespective of what ψ b and ψ c are, it is the case that (L , A, D) is a ψ-conjectural equilibrium but not a CBE. Indeed, verify that this is the case by taking μ a = (1 (A, C) ), μ b = (1 (L , D) ) and μ c = (1 (L , A) ). Hence, we conclude that there is no signal structure ψ that makes the set of ψ-conjectural equilibria coincide with the set of CBE. While CBE is not a special case of conjectural equilibrium, there still seems to exist a very close link between the two. Indeed, as we show below, a CBE is indeed equivalent to a new variant of conjectural equilibrium with multiple signals.
Let us begin by defining for each player i ∈ I the collection i :
, . . . , ψ n i } of signal functions such that for an arbitrary j ∈ I the signal function ψ
Theorem 2 A strategy profile is a CBE if and only if it is a -conjectural equilibrium.
The previous result provides a natural characterization of CBE. Indeed, recall that a conjectural equilibrium allows the players' conjectures to be false, but still requires them to be consistent with the observed data which arrive in the form of signals. Thus, a -conjectural equilibrium postulates that each players receives separate data for each opponent's strategy and confirms her marginal conjectures. However, she is not able-using these independently received signals-to test whether her opponents' strategies are statistically independent or not, which is why her beliefs might be correlated. But then, this is exactly what happens in a CBE, viz., players are correct in their marginal beliefs about every opponent, but perhaps wrong when assessing the possibility of their opponents' strategies being correlated.
Rationalizability
In this section we study the relationship between CBE and the different forms of rationalizability. First, we relate CBE to correlated rationalizability, and subsequently to independent rationalizability. There are two equivalent definitions of correlated rationalizability. First, according to the iterative definition a strategy profile is correlated rationalizable whenever it survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS). 8 Alternatively, according to the fixed point definition a strategy profile is correlated rationalizable if it belongs to a product of justifiable strategy sets, with the property that each justifiable strategy of each player is a best response to a (possibly correlated) belief over the opponents' justifiable strategy profiles (Brandenburger and Dekel 1987) . Formally, a set of justifiable strategies is called best response set and is defined as follows: Consider some D i ⊆ A i for each player i ∈ I with the property that, for every a i ∈ D i there exists a conjecture μ i ∈ × j =i D j such that a i ∈ B R i (μ i ). Then, we say that 
It is well-known that every NE is a correlated rationalizable strategy profile. In fact, this is also true for every CBE, as the supports of the mixed strategies played in a CBE have the best response property, as shown below.
Proposition 4 Every CBE is correlated rationalizable.
Clearly, the converse is not true, e.g., in two player games it is often the case that Nash equilibria form a strict subset of the set of correlated rationalizable strategy profiles.
In general, notice that the (fixed point) definition of correlated rationalizability incorporates two assumptions, viz., each player is rational, and moreover each player correctly believes that every opponent plays a justifiable strategy. In this sense, CBE lies between NE and correlated rationalizability. Indeed, CBE postulates only CMB, whereas correlated rationalizability does not require eiether IB or CMB. Now, we turn our attention to independent rationalizability, which strengthens correlated rationalizability in the sense that it requires each player to have independent beliefs (Bernheim 1984; Pearce 1984) . Formally, independent rationalizability is defined as follows: Consider some D i ⊆ A i for each player i ∈ I with the property that, for every a i ∈ D i there is some
we say that D 1 × · · · × D n satisfies the independent best response property (with each D i being an independent best response set), and every (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ × i∈I (D i ) is said to be independently rationalizable.
It is well known that there is a monotonic relationship in the strategy profiles that are predicted by NE, independent rationalizability and correlated rationalizability, in the respective order. Indeed, the following figure illustrates the relationship between the different solution concepts that we have discussed so far, together with the additional implicit condition that needs to be imposed in order to go from one to the other. 8 Recall that IESDS yields the strategy profiles that can be played under rationality and common belief in rationality (Brandenburger and Dekel 1987; Tan and Werlang 1988). What is not straightforward from the previous figure is the relationship between independent rationalizability and CBE, as the two concepts relax different assumptions of NE, viz. in comparison with NE, CBE relaxes IB, whereas independent rationalizability relaxes CMB. In fact, it turns out that none of the two concepts refines the other. Indeed, it is straightforward that not every independently rationalizable strategy profile is always a CBE, e.g., in two-player games, the set of CBE coincides with the set of NE, and therefore there are games with independently rationalizable strategy profiles that are not CBE. Furthermore, it follows from the following example that there are games where a CBE is not independently rationalizable. (A, C) ; 
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It follows from the previous discussion that the strategy profiles that can be played under the different solution concepts satisfy the inclusion relationships shown in the following figure. In general, whether these inclusions are weak or strict depends on the game in hand.
Nash equilibria
Independently rationalizable profiles Correlated-belief equilibria
Correlated rationalizable profiles
Thus, a natural question that arises at this point is whether the shaded area is empty or not. In other words, is it the case that a CBE is a NE if and only if it is independently rationalizable? It turns out that this is not the case in general. To see this, consider Example 1, and observe that every strategy profile is independently rationalizable, while at the same time there exists a CBE which is not a NE.
At first glance, this last observation looks somewhat surprising. The reason is that the conditions imposed in a CBE, together with those imposed by independent rationalizability, seem to suffice for a NE. However, if we take a closer look, we realize that there may exist some independently rationalizable CBE (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) such that for some i ∈ I the only product measure ν i over the opponents' justifiable strategy profiles, which also satisfies σ i ∈ B R i (ν i ), induces different marginal conjectures than μ i , and therefore (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) is not a NE. For instance, in Example 1, the only product measures over {A, B} × {C, D} that make L a rational strategy, put probability 1 to (A, C) or probability 1 to (B, D) . However, none of these product measures induces the same marginal conjectures as μ a , and therefore the independently rationalizable CBE is not a NE.
Correlated equilibrium
So far, correlation has entered the picture only in the form of players having correlated conjectures. However, it is sometimes the case that the players' actual strategies are indeed correlated. Obviously, in this case the set of possible objective distributions (over A) increases. Having recognized this possibility Aumann introduced the concept of correlated equilibrium, which generalizes NE both in terms of strategy profiles, as well as in terms of expected payoff vectors (Aumann 1974 (Aumann , 1987 .
In this case, correlation takes place via some correlating random device , (P i ) i∈I , (π i ) i∈I , where is a finite state space and P i is i's information partition over . 9 The probability measure π i ∈ ( ) describes player i's prior beliefs. If there is some π ∈ ( ) such that π i = π for all i ∈ I , we say that there is a common prior, and the correlating device is called objective. Otherwise, we say that the correlating device is subjective. The P i -measurable functionâ i : → A i determines the pure strategy that player i undertakes upon observing the event P i (ω), withÂ i being the set of all (P i -measurable) contingent strategy plans. As usual, defineÂ := × i∈IÂi andÂ −i := × j =iÂ j with typical elementsâ andâ −i respectively. Obviously, eacĥ a ∈Â can be thought as a (P 1 ∨ · · · ∨ P n )-measurable function, mapping each ω to the pure strategy profile â 1 (ω), . . . ,â n (ω) . 10 A tuple , (P i ) i∈I , (π i ) i∈I , (â i ) i∈I , consisting of a subjective (resp. objective) correlating device and a contingent strategy profile, is called a subjective (resp. objective) correlated strategy profile. For each player's prior, a correlated strategy profile induces the probability distribution p i := (π i •â −1 ) ∈ (A) over the set of strategy profiles, i.e., player i's prior attaches probability 9 Note that the state space conceptually differs from the state space S defined earlier in that each ω ∈ corresponds to a realization of a physical randomizing device, whereas each s ∈ S corresponds to a description of each player's strategy and belief hierarchy. 10 As usual, (P 1 ∨ · · · ∨ P n ) denotes the coarsest common refinement of the partitions (P i ) i∈I .
to each a ∈ A. Of course, p i is not necessarily a product measure over A. In this respect it becomes obvious that the set of correlated strategy profiles induces strictly more distributions over A than the set of mixed strategy profiles does. Player i's expected utility from , (P i ) i∈I , (π i ) i∈I , (â i ) i∈I is equal to
Then, we say thatâ i is a best response toâ −i , and we writeâ i ∈ B R i (â −i ), whenever it is the case that
Note that in a correlated equilibrium players are allowed to have correlated beliefs. However, the (possibly correlated) beliefs are not arbitrary. Instead they are derived from the correlating device. In this respect, player i has correct beliefs about how the strategies of her opponents are actually correlated, whereas in a CBE players do not in general have correct beliefs about the source of correlation that they consider. This implies that in principle there seem to exist games where CBE is a weaker concept than correlated equilibrium. However, as Proposition 5 below indicates, this is not the case, viz., the strategy profiles played in an arbitrary CBE can also be played in a subjective correlated equilibrium. (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) is a CBE. Then, there exists a subjective correlated equilibrium , (P i ) i∈I , (π i ) i∈I , (â i ) i∈I such that marg A i p i = σ i for all i ∈ I .
Proposition 5 Suppose that
Of course, the converse of the previous result does not hold in general, e.g., in twoplayer games, every CBE is a NE, and therefore there may exist correlated equilibria with the property that the marginal distributions do not form a CBE. This is not very surprising as in a correlated equilibrium-unlike what happens in a CBE-we allow players to believe that their own strategy is correlated with their conjecture. Yet, in order to prove Proposition 5, we construct a correlating device that rules out this type of correlation, viz., we take the prior π i of every player to be equal to the product measure σ i ⊗ μ i . Thus, intuitively the predictions of a CBE can be obtained as predictions of a special class of subjective correlated equilibria, namely those that satisfy independence between each player's own strategy σ i and own conjecture μ i .
An important implication of Proposition 5 is that the (subjective) correlation that is incorporated in the conjectures in a CBE can be shifted to (objective) correlation induced by a correlating device in a subjective correlated equilibrium. Of course, this could be also done indirectly, by combining the well-known result of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) with our Proposition 4. In particular, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) proved that correlated rationalizability is equivalent to a refinement of subjective correlated equilibrium, viz., a posteriori equilibrium. Therefore, since an arbitrary CBE is correlated rationalizable (Proposition 5), it must also be the case that there exists an a posteriori equilibrium inducing the same strategies as the CBE. Still, our constructive proof of Proposition 5 clearly illustrates the differences in the degree of correlation that may appear in a CBE and in a subjective correlated equilibrium.
Finally, a natural question that arises at this point is whether the previous result also holds for an objective correlated equilibrium. As it turns out, this is not the case, as illustrated in the following example. X, L , B) , both conditions of a CBE are satisfied. In fact, notice that μ a and μ b are the only conjectures that satisfy the required conditions for Ann and Bob respectively. Now, suppose that there exists an objective correlated equilibrium , (P i ) i∈I , π, (â i ) i∈I with marg A i p = σ i for all i ∈ I . Then, it is necessarily the case that Ann plays X and Bob plays L at all states ω ∈ Supp(π ), and therefore p assigns probability 1 to {X }×{L}×{A, B}×{C, D}. Moreover, both Ann and Bob are rational, in the sense that X (resp. L) is a best response to marg A a p (resp. to marg A b p). However, this cannot be the case as there is no probability measure p ∈ (A) with the property that marg A a p = μ a and marg A b p = μ b hold simultaneously. Therefore, we reach a contradiction, implying that there is no objective correlated equilibrium inducing the same marginal distributions as the CBE (σ a , σ b , σ c , σ d ) . The intuition behind the conclusion of the previous example becomes clear if we go back to our informal discussion on the conditions that characterize the concept of correlated equilibrium. Indeed, recall that-unlike what happens in a CBE-in a correlated equilibrium players are required to have correct beliefs about how the strategies of the opponents are correlated, and these beliefs are actually restricted by the correlating device. Now, in the case of subjective correlated equilibrium, this restriction is not very severe as it is canceled out by the flexibility that the different priors provide. On the other hand, in an objective correlated equilibrium this flexibility disappears, and therefore, in some games, CBE may yield predictions that objective correlated equilibrium does not for any common prior, like for instance in Example 5.
thus completing the proof.
